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. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 1919-1920. 111 
III. TAXATION 
No. 2 
T wo important cases sustained objections to applications of the federal income tax. In each there was vigorous dis-
sent. Evans v. Gore2 held that the iconstitutional provision that the 
federal judges shall receive "a compensation whicr. shall not be di-
minished during their continuance in office" applies to diminution 
by inclusion of that <:ompensation in the assessment of the 
general federal tax on net income. The case at bar involved a tax 
on the 1918 compensation of a judge appointed in 1899. While not 
directly qualified by anything in the opinion, the decision would seem 
to have no application to judges appointed after the law taxing their 
income was first enacted. So also any increase in compensation 
should be subject to a tax on the books when the increase is ac-
corded. There would be force in the argument that the increase 
might be accompanied by subjection to a tax on the total compen-
sation, provided the net residue is greater than the salary before: 
the increase. The opinion of the court pointed out that the salary 
of the President is also protected from diminution and that the tax 
1 For the preceding instatlment reviewing cases on Miscellaneous Na-
tional Powers and Regulations of Commerce, see 19 MICH. L. REv. 1-34 
(November, 1920). 
•253 U. S. --, 40 Sup. Ct. 550 (1920). Mr. Justice Holmes wrote a 
dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred. See Edward S. 
Corwin, "Constitutional Law in 191g-1920,'' 14 AM. PoL. Sc1. Rsv. 635, at pp. 
641-644, and notes in 20 Col.UM. L. Rsv. 794; 34 HARV. L. REv. 70, 85; 7 VA. 
L. R~\'. 6g, 76; and 30 YAJJ~ L. J. 75. For a note on the case in the court 
below, see 18 MICH. L Ritv. 6g7. 
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on the salary is a diminution thereof. This, too, should have no 
application to a president who assumes office after the income tax 
is in force. Unless, therefore, the offending provision in the in-
come tax is formally repealed, it ought to be applicable to all future 
presidents and judges. It is somewhat surprising that the court 
should fail to point out this limit to the scope of the decision. Most 
of Mr. Justice Van Devanter's opinion is a recital of the history of 
the clause in question and a dissertation on the importance of the 
independence.of the judiciary. Nowhere does he directly refute the 
contention of the minority that this independence is not threatened 
by subjection to a burden that is borne equally by all citizens. 
He insists that taxation is diminution and that diminution of any 
kind is prohibited by the Constitution. The minority make two 
other points. One is that the .salary had lost its identity before the 
assessment of the tax on total net income for the year. The other 
is that the Sixteenth Amendment, giving Congress power to tax 
income from whatever source derived, specifically authorizes the 
tax in question. The majority's answer to the latter contention 
is the one previously accepted by a majority of the court in the 
Stock Dividend Case, i. e., that the Sixteenth Amendment does 
not extend the federal taxing power to new subjects, but merely 
forbids looking at the source of income to ascertain whether a 
tax thereon is in substance a dire.ct tax. s 
The Stock Dividend Case is Eisner v. Macomber." This held 
a For articles on other problems of federal taxation see Arthur A. Ballan-
tine, "Some Constitutional Aspects of the Excess Profits Tax", 29 YALE L. J. 
625, Minor Bronaugh, "Regulation of Child Labor by Federal Taxation", 23 
LAW NOTES 7, Robert Eugene Cushman, "+'he National Police Power, Under 
the Taxing Clause of the Constitution", 4 MINN. L. Riw. 247, Hatry Hub-
bard, "The Sixteenth Amendment", 33 HARV. L. Riw. 794. and Noel Sargent, 
''Bills for Raising Revenu~ Under the Federal and State Constitutions", 4 
MINN. L. Riw. 330. For a note on federal taxation of child labor see 6 VA. 
L. Riw. 535. Cases holding that the federal estate tax is chargeable against 
the residuary estate and not against specific legacies are discussed in 33 
HARV. L. Riw. 323, I8 MICH. L. Riw. 161, and 29 YAI.E L. J. 124 The ques-
tion of statutory construction whether a state inheritance tax may be de-
ducted from the assessment of the federal income tax is considered in 20 
CoLUM. L. REY. 229, and 30 YAU L. J. I99. 
'252 U.S. 18g, 40 Sup. Ct. 18g (1920). See Charles E. Clark, ''Eisner v. 
Macomber and Some Income Tax Problems'', 29 YALE L. J. 735, Edward S. 
Corwin, op. cit. 14 AM. POL. Ser. REV. 635, Fred R. Fairchild, "The Stock 
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by a five to four vote that a stock dividend is capital and not 
income. A tax thereon is therefore a direct tax which must be 
apportioned among the states according to population. Mr. 
Justice Brandei.s, in a dissent concurred in by Mr. Justice Clarke, 
argued that the stock dividend is a transfer by the corporation to 
the stockholder of a different interest from that which he had be-
fore and is substantially similar to a cash dividend or to a dividend 
in property such as the stock of another corporation, both of 
which had been held to be income. For the majority Mr. 
Justice Pitney distinguished these cases by saying that they 
dealt with transactions in which the stockholder got something with 
which the corporation had parted. In issuing a stock dividend, how-
ever, a corporation retains all its assets. The stockholder gets none 
of them. He gets nothing but new pieces of paper which reduce the 
value of his old pieces of paper, so that the old and the new to-
gether are worth no more than the old were worth before the split. 
Mr. Justice Brandeis sought also to analyze the tax on stock divi-
dends as a way of looking through the corporate entity and taxing 
the stockholder on his interest in the income of the corporation, but 
postponing the tax until that corporate income takes the form of a 
stock d~vidend. To this, Mr. Justice Pitney retorted that, unless 
the corporation is treated as a substantial entity, separate from the 
stockholder, there is no income to the stockholder except as the 
corporation acquires it. Any payment by the corporation to the 
stockholder is merely a change of the stockholder's money from 
one pocket to another. The argument of the government that the 
stock dividend measures the extent to which gains accumulated by 
the corporation have made the stoc;kholder richer was answered by 
Dividend Decision", 5 Buu .. NAT. TAx Ass'N. 208, Thomas Reed Powell, 
"The Stock Dividend Decision and the Corporate Nonentity", 5 BuLI .. NAT. 
TAX Ass'N. 201, "The Judicial Dehate on the Taxability of Stock Dividends 
as Income", 5 BuLL. N .\T. TAX Ass'N. 247, "Stock Dividends, Direct Taxes, 
and the Sixteenth Amendment'', 20 Cor.uM. L. RJ>v. 536, A. M. Sakolski, 
"Accounting Features of the Stock Dividend Decision", 5 Bur.r.. NAT. TAX 
Ass'N. 2r2, Edward H. Warren, "Taxability of Stock Dividends as Income", 
33 HARV. L. Rmr. 885, and notes in 18 M1cH. L. Ritv. 68g, 4 MINN. L. lb>\•. 
462 68 C. P ..... I.Aw Rm . . ~94. 6 VA. L. REG. n. s. 220, and 29 YALE L. J. 812. 
For an article written prior to the decision and submitted to the Supreme 
Court as part of the brief for Mrs. Macomber, see Edwin R A Seligman. 
·'Are St~ck Dividends Income?" 9 AM. Ee. RJ>v. 517. 
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saying that this would depend upon how long he had held his stock 
and that any such enrichment is merely an increase in capital in-
vestment and not income. The central position of the majority is 
that separation and receipt of something are essential to income and 
that there is no separation and no receipt when the corporation 
parts with none of its assets. Mr. Justice Brandeis's answer is 
that substantially the stock dividend is equivalent to a dividend in 
the stock of a subsidiary and to an extraordinary cash dividend 
coupled with a preferential opportunity to subscribe to a ·propor-
tionate amount of newly issued stock, both of which have been held 
to be taxable income. Mr. Justice Holmes, in a separate dissent 
concurred in by Mr. Justice Day, concedes that on sound princi-
ples a stock dividend is not income, but adds : 
"I think that the word 'incomes' in the Sixteenth Amend-
ment should be read in 'a sense most obvious to the· common 
understanding at the time of its adoption' •.•. For it was 
for public adoption that it was proposed.... The known 
purpose of this amendment was to get rid of nice questions 
as to what might be direct taxes, and I cannot doubt that 
most people not lawyers would suppose when they voted for 
it that they put a question like the present to rest. I am of 
the opinion that the Amendment justifies the tax."5 
Complaints against state taxation fall under four main heads: 
(1) lac}<: of jurisdiction; (2) wrongful discrimination; (3) im-
proper procedure for assessment or collectio~; and ( 4) exaction 
of money for purposes not public. This classification will be fol-
1 For decisions in suits to recover suGcession taxes assessed under the 
Spanish War Revenue Act. see Henry v. United States, 251 U. S. 393, 40 
Sup. Ct. 185 (1920), and Simpson v. United States, 252 U. S. 547, 40 Sup. 
Ct. 367 ( 1920). The question when income is received within the meaning 
of the federal Income Tax Act is considered in Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
United States, 25r U. S. 342, 40 Sup. Ct. 155' (1920). Questions of allow-
able deductions under the Income Tax Act are answered in Penn Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. v. Lederer, 252 U. S. 523, 40 Sup. Ct. 397 (1920). 
For a note on United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct. 2r4 
(1919) which sustained the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act, see 6 VA. L. Rsv. 
535. Crocker v. Malley, 249 U. S. 223, 39 Sup. Ct. 270 (19r9), dealing with 
the misessment of the federal income tax on Massachusetts real estate trusts, 
is considered in 33 HARV. L. Rsv. nS. 
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lowed so far as possible, except that all complaints against special 
assessments will be treated together. Two cases applied the well-
established rule that intangibles may be taxed to their owner at his 
domicile. Magttire v. 1'rcfry0 approved of a tax at the domicile on 
income from a trust estate created and administered in another 
state in which the securities were kept by the trustee. The income 
tax in question was not a general one, but a substitute for the ordi-
nary tax on intangibles. The subject matter of the tax was said to 
be "the property right belonging to the beneficiary, realized in the 
shape of income." Though the legal title to the property was held 
in another state, the beneficiary was said to have "an equitable right, 
title and interest distinct from its legal ownership." The case was 
said to present no difference in principle from the taxation of 
credits to the creditor at his domicile. Mr. Justice Day wrote the 
opinion of the court. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented, without 
opinion. 
Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks Coimty1 sustained a tax 
on the value of the outstanding stock of a domestic corporation, 
in excess of the value of the real and personal property and 
certain indebtedness. Mr. Justice Brandeis said that it is not ne-
cessary to consider whether- the demand is an excise tax or a prop-
.:rty tax. It is either on intangibles or measured by them and is 
therefore good. The absence of tangible property in the state 
makes no difference. Though the intangible may be taxed at the 
situs of the tangible with which it is associated, it may also have a 
situs of its own at the domicile of the corporation. The Four-
teenth Amendment does not prohibit bi-state double taxation.8 
The vice of extraterritoriality can be committed not only by 
directly taxing property beyond the jurisdiction but also by taking 
account of such property to increase the assessment of what is con-
cededly taxable. An instance of this appears in Wallace v. Ilines,9 
already considered in the sub-section on state taxation of interstate 
•253 U.S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 417 (1920). See 90 CENT. L. J. 439, 
'253 U. S. -, 40 Sup. Ct 558 (1920). 
•For a note on taxing a stock-exchange seat as intangible property at 
the domicile of the owner, see 29 YALJ~ L. J. 916. On the mode of assessing 
good will see 33 HARV. L. Rsv. 323. On the situs of property transferred by 
executors to themselves as trustees under the will see 29 YALS L. J. 467. 
• 253 U. S. 66, 40 Sup. Ct. 435 (1920), 19 M1cH. L. RI-:\•. 30. 
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commerce. This corrected North Dakota's assumption that it con-
tains as much of the total value of an interstate railroad as the 
length of the main track in North Dakota bears to the length of 
the whole line. The opinion declares specifically that this defect is 
as bad in an excise on foreign corporations as in a ta.x formally on 
their property. The exaction is called "an unwarranted interfer-
ence with interstate commerce and a taking of property without due 
process of law." Whether it would be a violation of the due pro-
cess clause if the corporation were not engaged in interstate com-
merce is not specifically declared, but all the discussicn in the opin-
ion is on the evil of assessing extraterritorial values. An old case10 
not explicitly overruled sanctions an excise on a foreign corporation 
not engaged in interstate commerce though the assessment takes ac-
count of total capital stock representing property largely in other 
states. As elaborated elsewhere,11 this case can be distinguished 
logically from decisions like Wallace v. Hines which adduce the due 
process as well as the commerce clause to annul similar taxes on 
foreign corporations engaged partly in interstate commerce. But 
the tenor of recent opinions makes it pretty evident that the court 
is prepared to accord to foreign corporations engaged exclusively 
in local commerce the same relief that it gives to those doing a 
combined local and interstate business.12 
Complaints of non-residents against state inheritance and state 
income taxes include extraterritoriality and discrimination against 
citizens of other states. The inheritance tax case is .Ma%1.vell v. 
Bugbee.13 In assessing its inheritance tax on the tangible property 
and the stock in New Jersey corporations left by non-resident de-
"°Hom Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, 12 Sup. Ct. 
403 (18g2). 
:n "The Changing Law of Forejgn Corporations", 33 PoL. ScL QUART. 
549, and "State Excises on Foreign Corporations", PRocminmcs OF THt· NA-
.TIONAL TAx AssoCIA'.l'ION FOR 1919, page 230. 
12 For notes on the Connecticut corporate excise measured by income, see 
20 CoLUM. L. fuv. 324, and 33 HARV. L. Ri;v. 736. The Connecticut decision 
has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court. For a discussion of an excise 
on vehicles measured by their capacity see 33 HARV. L. Rltv. 737. 
"'250 U. S. :s25, 40 Sup. Ct. 2 (1919). See Joseph F. McCioy, "Tricks 
of Taxation Under the New Jersey Inheritance Tax Law", 3 BuLI •. NAT. 
TAX Ass'N. 145, and notes in 33 HARv. L. REv. 582, 616, 14 ILL. L. Rltv. 661, 
68 U. PA. L. REv. 184, and 29 YALt.L. J. 46.;. 
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cedents, New Jersey takes that part of the tax that would have 
been due on the whole estate, had the decedent been a resident, 
as the taxable property in New Jersey bears to the whole estate. 
The effect of this is to use extra-state property to determine the ap-
plication of the progressive rates of assessment to the New Jersey 
property. The rate depends not on the amount of New Jersey as-
sets but on the total assets of the estate. The New Jersey assets 
thus get placed somewhere around the middle of the estate instead 
of at the bottom. In dissenting from the judgment sustaining the 
tax, Mr. Justic.e Holmes for himself, the Chief Justice and Justices 
Van Devanter and McReynolds observed: 
"Many things that a legislature may do if it does them 
with no ulterior purpose, it <:atlllot do as a means to reach 
what is beyond its constitutional power .... New Jersey can-
not tax the property of Hill or McDonald outside the State 
and cannot use her power over property within it to accom-
plish by indirection what she cannot do directly •••• 
It seems to me that when property outside the State is 
taken into account for the purpose of increasing the tax 
upon property within it, the property outside is taxed in 
effect, no matter what form of words may be used. It ap-
pears to me that this cannot be done, even if it should be done 
in such a way as to secure equality between residents in New 
Jersey and those in other states. 
New Jersey could not deny to ·residents in other States 
the right to take legacies which it granted to its own citi-
zens, and therefore its power to prohibit all legacies cannot 
be invoked in aid of a principle that affects the foreign resi-
dents alone." 
The majority, however, speaking through Mr. Justice Day, in· 
voked the principle sometimes applied that taxes on a privilege 
may be measured by property not itself subject to levy. The tax 
is not on property and therefore not on extra-state property. The 
apparent discrimination against non-residents is not a denial of 
equal protection of the laws or a violation of the provision that "the 
citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several states." The reason is that the dis-
crimination is based on a reasonable classification and not an arbi-
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trary one. The resident decedent stands in a different relation to 
the state than does the non-resident. His whole estate is taxed on 
its devolution, while not all even of the New Jersey assets o·f non-
residents enter into the assessment of their estates. "The question 
of equal protection must be decided as ·between resident and non-
resident decedents as classes, rather than by the incidence of the tax 
upon the particular estates" before the court. Inequalities "that re-
sult not from hostile discrimination, but occasionally and incident-
ally in the application of a system that is not arbitrary in its classi-
fication, are not sufficient tO defeat the law."H 
The two state income tax cases are Shaffer v. Carter15 and 
Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.16 Mr. Shaffer, who lived in 
Chicago, did not want to be taxed by Oklahoma on income arising 
from Oklahoma oil wells. He argtred that an income tax is a per-
sonal tax and can therefore not be levied on persons not domicil~d 
in the taxing jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Pitney answered that "this 
argument, on analysis, resolves itself into a mere question of defini-
tions, and has no legitimate bearing upon any question raised under 
11 For articles on inheritance taxation see R. W. Carrington, "Death 
Duties", 6 VA. L. Rsv. 568, Charles W. Gerstenberg, "The Importance of 
UnifiC'ation of Inheritance Tax Laws"', 5 BULL. NAT. TAX Ass'N. 281, Thomas 
Reed Powell, "Extra-territorial Inheritance Taxation", 20 CoLUY. L. Rsv. 
l, 283, Allen Sherman, "Studies in Inheritance Taxation", 13 MAI~ L. Rsv. 
78, 127, and Delger Trowbridge, "Inheritance Tax Laws as Affecting Powers 
of Appo~ntment", 8 CALIF. L. Rsv. 216. 
The fo11owing editorial notes deal with inheritance taxation : transfers 
inter vivos, 33 HARV. L. R.Ev. 481, IS IL!,. L. R.Ev. lo6; foreign realty under 
doctrine oi equitable conversion, 5 IowA L. BuLL: 278, 29 YAL!t L. J. 8o8; 
suit in foreign state to co11ect inheritance tax, S CoRN£LL L. Q. 309, 33 HARV. 
L. R~. &to, 870; whether Hetty Green was doing business in New York 
within the meaning of the inheritance tax law, 33 HARV. L. R.Ev. 616, 18 
MICH. L. Rsv. 346; transfer of joint account at death of one joint owner, 29 
YALE L. J. 465; land devised in fulfillment of contract ordered sold to pay 
inheritance tax, 29 YALE L. J. 8o8; extra inheritance tax on property not 
taxed during lifetime of deceased, 20 CoLUM. L. Rsv. 625. 
"'252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221 (1920). See 90 CENT. L. J. 277, 20 
COLUK. L. Rsv. 457, 18 MICH. L. R.Ev. 547, and 29 YALE L. J. 799. 
11 252 U. S. 6o, 40 Sup. Ct. 228 ( 1920). See references in note 15 supra. 
For articles on the New York income tax written prior to the decision in the 
principal case see Edwin R. A. Seligman, "The New York Income Tax", 34 
PoL. Ser. QUART. 521, and "The Taxation of Non-residents in the New York 
Income Tax", 5 BULL~ NAT. TAx Ass'N. 40. 
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the federal Constitution." He reviewed what Oklahoma did for 
· Mr. Shaffer~s oil wells and concluded : "That it may tax the land 
but not the crop, the tree but not the fruit, the mine or well but net 
the product, the business but not the profit derived from it, is wholly 
inadmissible." Another ingenious contention levelled against the 
tax was that the income assessed is the joint product of Oklahoma. 
wells and Chicago intelligence and that since Oklahoma cannot tell 
how much comes from the earth and how much from extra-state 
management, it cannot tax any. This was answered by saying that 
"at most, there might be a question whether the value of the service 
of management rendered from without the state ought not to be al-
lowed as an expense incurred in producing the income; but no such 
question is raised in the present case and we express no opinion 
upon it." ·The complaint that non-residents are discriminated 
against because they are not allowed to deduct losses incurred in 
other states, as residents are allowed to do, was dismissed by point-
ing out that residents are taxed on income from other states while 
non-residents are .not. The difference of treatment "is only such 
as arises naturally from the extent of the jurisdiction of the state 
in the two classes of cases, and cannot be regarded as an unfriendly. 
or unreasonable discrimination." An interesting question respect-
ing the procedure for collecting the tax will be dealt with in a 
moment. 
Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.11 reaffirmed the power of a 
state to tax the income of non-residents earned within its borders. 
The principle was declared to cover incomes "arising from any_ 
business, trade, profession, or occupation" carried on within the 
borders of the state. The discussion of the procedure for collect-
ing the tax, which will be considered later, makes it clear that in-
come earned within the· state is taxable though the income is_ pai~ 
and received elsewhere. But this New York tax on the income of 
non-residents was held unconstitutional because residents were al-' 
lowed personal and fa~ily exemptions while non-residents were 
not. Whether the non-resident must be granted the same exemp-:: 
tion as the resident or only such part thereof as his New York 
income bears to his total income -was not considered. The dis-
crimination before the court was held to be forbidden by the 
1
' Note 15, supra. 
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clause declaring that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to 
all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." The 
statute was said to produce, not merely "a case of occasional or ac-
cidental inequality due to circumstances personal to the taxpayer," 
like that in the New Jersey inheritance tax law, but "a general rule, 
operating to the disadvantage of all non-residents including those 
who are citizens of the neighboring states, and favoring all resi-
dents including those who are citizens of the taxing state." New 
Jersey and Connecticut citizens compete with New York citizens 
for New York jobs, as the Constitution gives them the dght to do. 
"Whether they must pay a tax upon the first $1,000 or $2,000 of in-
come, while their associates and competitors who reside in New 
York do not, makes a substantial difference." 
In two other cases corporations insisted that discriminations 
against them worked a denial of equal protection of the laws. The 
complainant in F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virgi11ia18 was success-
ful. All the court but Justices Brandeis and Holmes thought it 
arbitrary and unreasonable to make domestic r.orporations doing 
some business in the state pay a tax on all their income wherever 
earned, while domestic corporations doing no business in the state 
paid on none of their income. Hence they relieved the sufferer 
from the exaction on its extra-state income. Mr. Justice Brandeis, 
in dissenting, thought of a reason for the difference of treatment. 
There were other taxes to which all domestic corporations are 
alike subjected. Thus the state gets revenue from corporations 
chartered there but doing all their business elsewhere. This rev-
enue might be lost if such corporations found Virginia's demands 
so exacting that they changed their domicile to some sister state 
Corporations doing business in Virginia would be less apt to try to 
move. This is to say that it is reasonable to squeeze some and not 
others when the others have a source of self-help which the some 
have not. 
Though the complainant in Ft. Smith l.,1ember Co. v. Arkansas1D 
was sent away comfortless, it had the satisfaction of knowing that 
Justices McKenna, Day, Van Devanter and McReynolds sympa-
thized ~ith it. They dissented, but without saying why. Under the 
'"253 U.S.-, 40 Sup. Ct. 56o (1920). See 20 Cor.uu. L. ~. 79J. 
"251 U. S. 532, -40 Sup. Ct. 304 (1920). 
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Arkansas law individual stockholders of domestic corporations 
were not taxed on their stock, nor were they subject to reasses!-
ment of back taxes. To a domestic corporation which desired simi-
lar treatment, Mr. Justice Holmes replied for a majority of the 
court: 
"The objection to the taxation as double may be laid on one 
side. That is a matter of State law alone. The Fourteenth 
Amendment no more forbids double taxation than it does 
doubling the amount of the tax; short of confiscation or pro-
ceedings unconstitutional on other grounds .... We are of 
opinion that it also is within the power of a State, so far as 
the Constitution of the United States is concerned,, to tax its 
own corporations in respect of the stock held by them in other 
domestic corporations, although unincorporated stockholders 
are exempt. A State may have a policy in taxation •••• If the 
State of Arkansas wished to discourage but not to forbid the 
holding of stock in one corporation by another and sought to 
attain the result by this tax, or if it simply saw fit to make 
corporations pay for the privilege, there would be nothing in 
the Constitution to hinder. A discrimination between corpor-
ations and individuals with regard to a tax like this cannot be 
pronounced arbitrary, although we may not know the preciBe 
ground of policy that led the State to insert the distinction in 
the law. 
The same is true with regard to i:onfining the recovery of 
back taxes to those due from corporations. It is to be pre-
sumed, until the contrary appears, that there were reasons for 
more strenuous efforts to collect admitted dues from corpora-
tions than in other cases, and we cannot pronounce it an un-
lawful policy on the part of the State.'; 
The double taxation referred to was predicated on the fact that 
the corporation whose stock was taxed to corporate stockholders was 
itself taxed on all that gave the stock value. 
Of four complaints against special assessments, only one got any 
balm. Branson v. Bush20 raised two issues. A railroad insisted that 
it was denied the equal protection of the laws because the valuation 
... .25r U. S. 18.2, 40 Sup. Ct. II3 (1919). 
of its property for the assessment of a special tax included franchise 
value. Inasmuch as the statute excluded the value of the franchise 
to be a corporation, the court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds, were satisfi.ed that the valuation was confined to that of 
the real estate estimated by considering the use to which it was put 
as an integral link in a larger unit, thus applying to special assess-
ments the rule long prevailing as to general property taxation.n 
The road also insisted that it was not benefited by the improved high-
way for which it was taxed, and the Circuit Court of Appeals had 
agreed that the evidence failed to show any such benefit. Mr. 
Justice Clarke recognized that the former announcement of the Su-
preme Court that the determination of the legislature as to the area 
benefited is conclusive had since been subjected to "the qualification, 
which was before implied, that the legislative determination can be 
assailed under the Fourteenth Amendment only where the legislative 
action is 'arbitrary, wholly unwarranted', 'a flagrant abuse and by 
reason of its arbitrary character a confiscation of particular prop-
erty' ." The absence of any such flagrant abuse in· the present case 
was predicated not only on the specific testimony but on "the obvious 
fact that anything that develops the territory which a railroad serves 
11 The District Court had "permanently enjoined the tax to the extent 
that it was imposed on personal property-the rolling stock and the materials 
of the company." As to the franchise value which had been inclnded, the 
court pointed out that the only basis on which to assume that this had been 
assessed was the presumption that the tax commission had followed the 
statute and "considered" the franchises. After remarking that this would be 
"''an unusually meagre basis surely for invalidating a tax of the familiar char-
acter <>f this before us", Mr. Justice Clarke continues: 
''ff, however, the distinction sometimes taken between the 'essential prop-
erties of corporate existence' and the franchises of a corporation * * * be · 
considered substantial enough to be of practical value, and if it be assumed 
that the distinction was applied by the state commission in making the as~ess­
ment heria involved, this would result, not in adding personal property value 
to the value of the real estate of the company, but simply in determining what 
the value of the real property was-its right of way, tracks and buildings-
having regard to the use which it made of it as an instrumentality for earning 
money in the conduct of railroad operations. This at most is no more than 
giving to the real property a value greater as part of a railroad unit and a 
going concern than it would ·have if considered only as a quantity of land, 
buildings and tracks." 
For a note on a case holding that pipe lines are personal property and not 
subject to a special assessment, see 20 Cor.m.r. L. Rlw. 703. 
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must necessarily be of benefit to it, and that no agency for such de-
velopment equals that of good roads."22 
A like rebuff met the similar contention in Goldsmith v. Prender-
gast Constritction Co. 23 that a sewer assessment was invalid because 
some of the property ·benefited was excluded from the are~ charged. 
The state court had conceded that some of the land in the unburden-
ed region might be drained into the sewer, but it had not thought this' 
sufficient to justify judicial interference with the exercise of the dis-
cretion vested in the municipal authorities. "Much less," says Mr. 
Justice Day, "do such findings afford reason for this court in the 
exercise of its revisory power under the federal Constitution to re-
verse the action of the state courts, which fully considered the facts, 
and refused to invalidate the assessment." 
Two complaints were-directed against the procedure for appor-
tioning benefits as the basis of special assessments. The plaintiff in 
Farncomb v. Denver ~ alleged that the hearing proffered by the 
statute was before a board which.had power only to recommend 
changes in the assessment and that therefore he was denied due pro-
cess of law. The state court, however, had construed the statute dif-
ferently and held that the city council could not only hear and recom-
mend but could also determine. This construction was of course bind-
ing on the Supreme Court. As the pll!intiff had not availed himself of 
the administrative opportunity open to him, he was denied judicial 
relief. In Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Severns Paving Co.2 rs there was 
some doubt whether the decree of the court below definitely assured 
a hearing on a re-assessment after the first assessment had been in-
validly laid against the owner rather than against the property, and 
the decree was therefore modified to make certain the right to a hear-
ing.211 
,.. For a note on an Illinois decision holding that a special assessment for 
paving could not be levied on lots which were part of a railroad right of way, 
see 29 YALE I.. J. 68!,l. . 
20 252 U. S. 12, 40 Sup. Ct. 273 (1920). 
"252 U.S.;, 40 Sup. Ct. 271 (1920). 
"251 U.S. 104' 40 Sup. Ct. 73 (1919). 
"For a note on taxing stockholders of a national bank without notice 
to them, see 4 MINN. L. lh:v. 305. 
For a discussion of the question whether the proceeds from the sale of 
property originally paid for by special assessments must be returned to those 
previously assessed, see 33 HARV. L. lh:v. 481: 
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Objections to the procedure for collecting the Oklahoma and 
New York income taxes on non-residents were held to be without 
sufficient foundation. In Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.21 a Con-
necticut corporation, having its main place of business in Connecti-
cut, but also carrying on business in New York, thought that New 
York ought not to be allowed to require it to adjust its system of 
accounting and paying salaries and wages to the extent required to 
deduct and withhold the New York tax. Mr. Justice Pitney answer-
ed that the withholding provisions applied only to salaries earned in 
New York, that the company might pay such salaries in New York, 
and that "the fact that it may be more convenient to pay them in 
Connecticut is not sufficient to deprive the state of New York of the 
right to impose such a regulation." The allegation of an unconstitu-
tional discrimination against citizens of other states because the 
withholding provisions applied only to non-residents was met by 
saying that this "does not in any wise increase the burden of the tax 
on non-residents, but merely recognizes the fact that as to them the 
state imposes no personal liability, and hence adopts a convenient sub-
stitute for it." 
The objection levelled against the procedure for collecting the 
Oklahoma tax sustained in Shaffer v. Carter28 related to the provi-
sion imposing a lien upon all the delinquent's property within the 
state, real and personal. Mr. Justice Pitney said that the objection 
reduces itself to this: · 
"that the state is without power to create a lien upon any 
property of a non-resident for income taxes except the very 
property from which the income proceeded; or, putting it in 
another way, that a lien for an income tax may not be imposed 
upon a non-resident's unproductive property, nor upon any 
particular productive property beyond the amount of the tax 
upon the income that has proceeded from it." 
He then stated that the facts of the case do not raise the question, 
as it appears that the whole of the complainant's property in Okla-
homa was used to produce oil and that "his entire business in that 
01 Note 16, supra. 
., Note 15, swpra. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
and other states was managed as one business, and his entire net in-
come in the state for the year 1916 was derived from that business.'' 
The opinion then proceeds : 
"Laying aside the probability that from time to time there 
may have been changes arising from purchases, new leases, 
sales, and expirations (none of which, however, is set forth in 
the bill), it is evident that the lien will rest upon the same 
property interests which were the source of the income and on 
which the tax is imposed. The entire jurisdiction of the state 
over appellant's property and ·business and the income that 
he derived from them-the only jurisdiction that it has sought 
to assert-is a jurisdiction in rem: and we are clear that the 
state acted within its lawful power in treating his property in-
terests and business as having both unity and continuity. Its 
purpose to impose income taxes was declared in its own con-
stitution, and the pi:ecise nature of the tax and the measures 
to be taken for enforcing it were plainly set forth in the act of 
1915; and plaintiff having thereafter proceeded, with notice 
of this law, to manage the property and conduct the business 
out of which proceeded the income now taxed, the state did 
not exceed its power or authority in treating his property in-
terests and his business as a single entity, and enforcing pay-
ment of the tax by the imposition of a lien, to be followed by 
execution or other appropriate process, upon all property em-
ployed in the business." 
This leaves unsettled a number of interesting questions certain 
to ar~e in the near future. Suppose the sources of income within 
the state are varied and unrelated to each other, may the whole tax 
be collected from any one piece of property? Suppose there is no 
·property·within the state, may any single payer of income to a non-
resident be required to withhold enough to ensure the tax on income 
paid by others as well? May a tax on income earned within the state 
be collected by garnisheeing debtors who owe the non-resident capital 
rather than income? Obviously it will be grievously vexatious to re-
quire withholding at the source of the tax on every single dollar of 
income going to a non-resident, as t~e state under the Yale & Town 
case may lawfully do. Yet if this is not done, non-residents are apt 
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to escape paying admitted dues unless some or all of the questions 
just raised are answered in the affirmative.29 
In two of the cases already considered there was dispute as to 
the propriety of the proceedings chosen by the taxpayer to contest 
the validity of the tax. Both involved injunctions against state taxes 
sought from a federal district court, and in both the issue was wheth-
er the complainant had an adequate remedy at law. The contention 
that the suit was in effect one against the state was not made. In 
Wallace v. Hinei1'0 the tax was made a lien on all the property of the 
railroad, thus putting a cloud upon the title, and delay _in paying the 
tax was visited with considerable penalties. The only remedy at law 
suggested to deprive equity of the jurisdiction it would otherwise 
have was that alleged by the state to be offered by a statute saying 
that "an action respecting the title to property, or arising upon con-
tiact may be brought in the district court against the State the same 
as against a private person." In sustaining the injunction, Mr. 
Justice Holmes said: 
"This case does not arise upon contract except in the purely 
artificial sense that some claims for money alleged to have 
been obtained wrongfully might have been en,forced at com-
mon law by an action of assumpsit. Nothing could be more 
remote from an actual contract than the wr-0ngful extortion 
of money by threats, and we ought not to leave the plaintiffs 
to a speculation upon what the State Court might say if an 
action at law were brought." 
In Shaffer v. Carter,31 the state procedure -for ·correcting and ad4 
justing tax returns, as interpreted by the state court, was said to fall 
"short of indicating-to say nothing of plainly showing-" that it 
"would afford an adequate remedy to a party contending that the 
income tax law itself was repugnant to the Constitution of the United 
States." But the decision that it was proper to resort to equity ~r . 
relief was placed more definitely on this ~arrower ground: · 
"For removal of a cloud upon title caused by an invalid lien 
imposed by a tax valid in itself, there appears to be no legal 
09 See Walter N. Seligsberg, "Collection of State Income Taxes from Non-
residents", s·Bur.r.. NAT. TAX Ass'N. 244 
.. Note 9, supra. 
oi Note 15, supra. 
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remedy. Hence, on this ground at least, resort was properly 
had to equity for relief ; and since a court of equity does not 
'do justice by halves,' and will prevent, if possible, a multi-
plicity of suits, the jurisdiction extends to the disposition of 
all questions raised by the bill." 
In this case the injunction ultimately failed because both the tax 
and the procedure for its collection were bound to be valid. 
In United States v. Osage Comit'y,32 which allowed the federal 
government to sue in the federal court to protect certain Indians 
from wrongful state taxation, "the existence of power in the 
~ United States to sue" was said to dispose "of the proposition that be-
cause of remedies afforded to individuals under the state law the 
authority of a 'Court of equity could not be invoked by the United 
States." Reference was made to the great number of Indians in-
volved and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Ward v. Love 
County38 reversed the decision of the Oklahoma court that taxes 
collected from Indians had been paid by them voluntarily and 
so could not be recovered back by suit. It was recognized that in 
general the question whether the taxes had been collected under 
compulsion after adequate protest is a non-federal one on which the 
detennination of the state court is 'Conclusive. But Mr. Justice 
Van Devanter pointed out that, if non-federal grounds plainly unten-
able may be thus successfully put forward in state courts, the power 
of the United States courts to review the federal question may be 
defeated. He found that the decision of the state court "that the 
taxes were paid voluntarily was without any fair or substantial sup-
port." The fact that the county might have paid over to the state or 
municipal bodies some of the taxes thus wrongfully extorted was 
held not to save it from making a refund to the Indians. On this 
point the opinion declared: 
"As the payment was not voluntary, but made under com-
pulsion, no statutory authority was essential to enable or re-
quire the county to refund the money. It is a well-settled rule 
that 'money got through im~sition' may be recovered back; 
12 251 U.S. 128, 40 Sup. Ct. 100 (1919), 19 MICH. L. REv. 17, note 24-
12253 U. S. 17, 40 Sup. Ct 419 (1920). To same effect, Broadwell v. 
Carter County, 253 U. S. 25, 40 Sup. Ct. 422 (1920). 
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and; as this court has said on several occasions, 'the oblig?-
tion to do justice rests upon all persons, natural and artifi-
cial, and if a couµty abtains the money or property of others 
without authority, the law, independent of any statute, wit! 
compel restitution or compensation' " •... To say that the 
county could collect these unlawful taxes by coercive means, 
and not incur any obligation to pay them back is nothing short 
of saying that it could take or appropriate the property of 
these Indian allottees arbitrarily and without due process of 
law. Of course this would be in contravention of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which binds the county as an agency of 
the state."84 Q 
In the other tax cases that have been considered, the taxing auth-
ority did not contest the propriety of the procedure by which the 
validity of the tax was questioned. Four involved injunctions against 
state taxes; two in federal courts35 and two in state courts.86 Four 
were actions brought against the taxpayer,37 and five were suits 
brought by the taxpayer to recover back taxes paid under protest,88 
One was a certiorari proceeding to review an assessment, begun in 
a state court and taken to the United States Supreme Court on writ 
of error.39 
A far-reaching issue of what is a requisite public purpose in ex-
ercising the taxing power came before the court in Green v. Frazier'D 
"'On the question of what constitutes payment under duress, see 29 
YAIJ! L. J. 574 
35 Branson v. Bush, note 20, supra; Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 
U. S. 355, 40 Snp. Ct. 355 (I920), I9 MICH. L. Rev. 32, note 57. 
""Farncomb v. Denver, note 24, supra; Wagner v. Covington, 25I U. S. 
95, 40 Sup. Ct. 93 ( I9I9). I9 MICH. L. Rev. 3I, note 56. ~ 
81 Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, note 7, supra; Ft. Smith 
Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, note I9, sttPra; Goldsmith v. Prendergast Construc-
tion Co., note 23, supra; Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Severns, note 25, supra . 
.. Evans v. Gore, note 2, supra,· Eisner v. Macomber, note 4 supra,· 
Maguire v. Trefry, note 6, supra; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, note 
IS, supra; Wagner v. Covington, 251 U.S. 95, 40 Sup. Ct. 93 (19I9), 19 MICH. 
L. Rev. 3I, note 56. '!'his last case included also a suit to enjoin the pay-
ment of the tax. 
19 Maxwell v. Bugbee, note I3, supra. It should be noted that New 
Jersey permits a broader use of certiorari than do most jurisdictions. 
'°253 U.S.--, 40 Sup. Ct. 499 (1920). For notes on cases prior to the 
Supreme Court decision, see 4 MINN. L. lbw. 65, "and 29 YAI."£ L. J. 933. For 
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in which the program of the Non-Partisan League in North Dakota 
was questioned. The state proposed to raise by taxation and bonds 
money to inaugurate a state bank, state warehouses, elevators and 
flour mills, and a state home building association which was to build, 
buy, sell anCl lease homes for the citizens of the state. Taxpayers 
sought an injunction in the state court and lost. The denial of the 
injunction was affirmed by the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Day 
declaring: 
"Under the peculiar conditions existing in North Dakota, 
which are emphasized in the opinion of its highest court, if 
the state sees fit to enter upon such enterprises as are nere 
involved, with the sanction of its Constitution, its Legisla-
ture and its.people, we are not prepared to say that it is with-
in the authority of this court, in enforcing the observance of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, to set aside such actions by judi-
cial decision." 
The "peculiar conditions" referred to included the facts that 
North Dakota is predominantly agricultural, that the existing system 
of transporting and marketing grain "prevents the realization of what 
are deemed just prices," and that a large proportion of the popula-
tion are tenants moving about from place to place and that an im-
proved opportunity to secure and maintain homes would promote the 
general welfare. In the course of the opinion Mr. Justice Day said 
that the -court had always declined to give a precise meaning to "due 
process of law," preferring "to leave its scope to judicial decision 
when cases from time to time arise." Though it has come to be rec-
ognized that due process prevents the states from imposing taxes for 
a merely private purpose, "courts, as a rule, have attempted no judi-
cial definition of a 'public' and distinguished from a'private' purpose, 
but have left each case to be determined by its own peculiar circum-
stances." Questions of policy are not for the court, nor is it con-
cerned with the wisdom of the legislation. It is pointed out that the 
public conduct of these business enterprises stands on a different 
footing from public gifts to privately conducted businesses. The 
articles inspired by the North Dakota program and touching the question of 
taxation, see Andrew A. Bruce, ''The Tyranny of the Taxing Power", 18 
MICH. L. Rsv. 5o8, and "State Socialism and the School Land Grants", 33 
HARV. L. Rsv. 401. 
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precise question before the court was found to be a novel one, but 
the case was thought to come within the principle of an earlier deci-
sion-i1 which found a sufficient public purpose in a municipal coal. 
and wood yard. The decision was unanimous. The North Dakota 
e.xperiment is thought ·by some to have a strong flavor of state so-
cialism. If they are right, the federal Constitution appears to allow 
more room for socialistic experiments than a, number of its most 
fervent eulogists would lead us to infer.'2 
IV. Por.1c:e Pow:ER 
The classification of cases on police power becomes increasingly 
difficult as we get farther and farther away from the conception of 
the police power as confined to the rudimentary requirements of 
health, morals and safety. Classification on the basis of the objects 
for which the power is exercised is hardly feasible when the same 
statute manifestly has several objects. ·Any grouping of cases un-
der the head of "general welfare" would carry a confession of in-
ability to classify. If, however, we regard the relationships, inter-
ests and subject matters dealt with, some fairly clear lines of division 
emerge. True, these lines cross each other so that the same statute 
may be put into more than one section if any one insists on being 
nice about it. Yet "food and drink", "occupations and professions," 
and "physical conditions" make convenient separate heads, even 
though they embrace statutes which also fall readily under the more 
general heads of "commercial intercourse," "industrial relations" or 
"public utilities." It seems ·best to group under the latter head all 
cases dealing with business which partakes of the nature of a public-
service enterprise, since the police power over such business is of a 
special kind. This grouping, however, must not be taken as imply-
ing that a business can not have one aspect of a public utility with-
out having all. Subjection to price fixing does not necessarily carry 
with it a duty to serve all. The regulatory power develops in a 
creep-mouse, crawl-mouse way, and each case is confined to its spe-
cial facts like all cases on police power. 
"Jones v. Portland, 245 U.S. 2I7, 38 Sup. Ct. n2 (I9I7). 
"'For notes on the constitutionality of state taxation to provide funds 
for bonuses or bounties to soldiers in the United States forces, see 33 HARV. 
L. Riw. 846, 87I, I8 MICH. L. Rsv. 535, ·699, 4 MINN. L. Rsv. 233, and 29 
YALll L. J. 6go. 
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Of the eighteen police power cases decided during the last term, 
twelve have to do with requirements on those whose business has 
sonie or all of the elements of a public utility. In Producers' Trans-
portation. Co. v. Railroad Commission,43 the complainant unsuccess-
fully resisted inclusion in this class. A pipe-line company sought to 
justify its resistance of the orders of the railroad commission on the 
ground that "it was constructed solely to carry crude oil for particu-
iar producers from their wells to the seacoast under strictly private 
contracts, and that. there had been no carrying for others, nor any 
devotion of the pipe line to a public use." Mr. Justice Van Devanter 
conceded that, if the facts were as alleged, the enterprise could not 
be converted ·by legislative fiat or administrative order into a public 
utility. But he sustained the state court and held the company al-
ready a common -carrier, in view of the facts that it readily admitted 
new producers and excluded none from the agency agreements it de-
vised, that its charter authorized it to carry on a general transporting 
business, and that it had exercised the power of eminent domain 
which it secured only by asserting that it was engaged in transporting 
oil by pipe line "as a common carrier for hire" and that the right of 
way sought was "for a public use.''" 
It is familiar that the initiation of a public-utility enterprise does 
not necessarily carry with it an obligation to continue indefinitely. 
This finds illustration in Brooks:-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Conunis-
sion45 in which a company was allowed to abandon the operation of 
a narr.ow-gauge railway which could not be run remuneratively. 
The state court had sustained the order of the commission forbid-
ding the abandonment, on the ground that the railroad corporation 
was identical with a lumber corporation and that the entire business 
of the concern was remunerative. But Mr. Justice Holmes declared 
that "a carrier cannot be compelled to carry on even a branch of 
business at a loss, much less the whole business 9f carriage." After 
noting qualifications on the principle where obli&"ations are im-
posed by charter, he continued: 
"But that special rule is far from throwing any doubt upon 
"251 U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. 131 (1920). See 18 MxcH. L. R1"v. 8o4 
"For a note on "what constitutes a public service", see 26 W. VA! L. Q. 
140. See also John B. Cheadle, "Governmental Control of Business", 20 
COLUY. L. R.r:v. 438, 550. 
"251 U. S. 3g6, 40 Sup. Ct. 183 (1920). 
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a general principle too well established to need further argu-
ment here. The plaintiff may be making money from its saw-
mill and lumber business, ·but it no more can be compelled to 
spend that than it can be compelled to spend any other money 
to maintain a railroad for the ·benefit of others who do not 
care to pay for it. If the plaintiff be taken to have granted 
to the public an interest in the use of ·the railroad, it may 
withdraw its grant by discontinuing the use when that use can 
be kept up only at a loss. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. n3, 126. 
The principle is illustrated by the many cases in which the 
constitutionality of a rate is shown to depend upon whether 
it yields to the parties concerned a fair return." 
The state court had mentioned also that the commission had order-
ed the company to submit a new schedule of transportation which 
might be operated at a profit, bµt this was dismissed by the Su-
preme Court as a mere makeshift and the language of hope un-
supported by any facts. 
Of six cases dealing with the imposition of duties on common 
carriers, two related to the kind and quality of service. Great North-
ern Ry. Co. v. Cah4ll'6 followed an earlier decision in holding that it 
is no part of the duty of a railroad to furnish cattle scales along its 
right of way, even though the public might be greatly benefited 
thereby. There is a faint hint in the opinion that there might be cir-
cumstanc,es which would raise a question as to some qualification of 
the doctrine, but the hint seems too faint to cause any fright to car-
riers. Sullivan v. Shreveport41 related to the mode of performing a 
conceded duty. It sanctions an ordinance requiring every s~reet· car 
to be operated by a conductor and motorman, notwithstanding con-
siderable evidence in support of the safety of a new type of one-man 
car. -There was other evidence of the possibility of danger and the 
certainty of inconvenience from this type of car. Mr. Justice Clarke 
observes that the operation of cars presents special problems in each 
·community and that the determination of the local authorities should 
be accepted except in clear cases of arbitrariness. 
Two cases required street railroads to help take care of the streets 
which they use. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. Wisconsin'8 
.. 253. U.S.-, 40 Sup. Ct. 457 (1920). 
"251 U.S. 169, 40 Sup. Ct. 102 (1919). 
"252 U.S. 100, 40 Sup. Ct. 3o6 (1920). 
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found nothing "inherently arbitrary or unreasonable" in enforcing 
a general undefined duty to repave a specified portion of the street 
by requiring a pavement of asphalt upon a concrete foundation when 
the rest of the street had been so paved by the city. Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. Police Court'-9 held that a requirement on a street 
railway to sprinkle the streets for a sufficient distance to prevent dust 
from flying from the operation of the cars is "generically embraced 
·by the police power" and that the power so possessed was "not unrea-
sonably exerted" so as to off end the requirements of due process. 
Two cases involved the location of tlle company's poles and 
wires. Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. Upper Sanduskyrro affirmed 
a state decree enjoining the restoration of poles and wires previously 
taken down and forbidding new additional construction without the 
consent of the city, which consent had been made a prerequisite by 
the statute under which the company had obtained its franchise. 
Though the decision is confined to restoration and new construction, 
it does not seem to rest wholly on the reservation in the statute un-
der which the franchise was derived. For Mr. Justice Clarke de-
clares: 
"We cannot doubt that the danger to life and property from 
wires carrying high tension electric current through village 
streets is so great that the subject is a proper one for regula-
tion by the exercise of the police power and very certainly 
the authorities of the municipality immediately interested in 
the safety and welfare of its citizens are a proper agency to 
have charge of such regulation." 
But this control must be exercised for legitimate police objects 
and not for the private proprietary advantage of the municipality, as 
appears from Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corpora,-
tion.1S1 Here the object of the city in ordering the removal and ~e­
location of poles and other facilities belonging to a lighting company 
was found to be, not the protection of health and safety, but the dis-
placement of the existing system with one to be constructed by the 
city. Over the dissent of Justices Pitney and Clarke, this was held 
a taking without due process of the property rights acquired under 
the franchise. The city's contentions were said to be based upon a 
"251 U.S. 22, 40 Sup. Ct. 79 (1919). See 29 YAI.£ L. J. 578. 
... 251 U.S. 173, 40 Sup. Ct. 104 (1919). 
11 251 U S. 32,"40 Sup. Ct. 76 ( 1919). See 5 VA. L. RllG. ti. 4. 797. 
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confusion of its governmental powers of police with its field of action 
in a proprietary or quasi-private capacity. Mr. Justice McKenna 
declares: 
"It will be observed that we are not concerned with the 
duty of the corporation operating a public utility to yield un-
compensated obedience to a police measure adopted for the 
protection of the public, but with a proposed uncompensated 
taking or disturbance of what belongs to one. lighting system 
in order to make -way for another. And this the Four-
teenth Amendment forbids. What the grant· was at its in-
ception it remained and was not subject to be displaced by 
some other system, even that of the city, without compensa-
tion to the corporation for :the rights appropriated." 
Of five cases relating to rate regulation, only one was directly. 
concerned with the reasonableness of the particular rates fixed. This 
is Groesoeck v. Duluth S. S. & A. Ry. Co.52 which rejected several 
special complaints adduced by the regulating authority against the 
calculations by which the district court had reached the conclusion 
that a two-cent fare would not yield the requisite fair return on fair 
value. The state wished to exclude the results of running sleeping 
and parlor cars, of operating a branch line used almost wholly for 
interstate commerce and a parallel line bought from a competitor· 
. and used almost wholly for freight traffic, and of running trains on 
a connecting line over which the complaining company had acquired 
traffic rights. As to the sleeping and parlor cars, Mr. Justice Bran· 
deis said that the diarges are substantially uniform throughout the 
country and that it would be practically impossible and obviously 
unwise fpr the road to abandon the service or .to increase the charges. 
to cover the cost of the particular service on its line. The other traf-
fic was over lines on which passengers under the statute were entitled 
to the two-cent fare, and the court thought it correct to treat all the 
lines as one, so that the more profitable parts of the system would 
carry those less profitable. In sustaining the apportionment of ex-
penses between freight and passenger services when the expenses 
were common to both, Mr. Justice Brandeis recognized that no satis-
factory formula had :thus far been worked out and said that "for the 
present, at least, what formula the trial court should adopt presents 
""250 U.S. 00], 40 Sup. Ct. 38 (1919). 
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a question, not at law, but of fact; and we are clearly unable to say 
that the lower court erred in adopting the method there pursued." 
What that method was he did not specify. 53 
The remaining cases on rate regulation deal with the procedure 
for fixing the rates and for contesting their reasonableness before the. 
courts. The plaintiff in St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Willia~ 
sought shelter under the rule that the imposition of severe penal-
ties as a means of enforcing a rate is in. contravention of due pro-
cess of law where no adequate opportunity is afforded ithe carrier 
for safely testing before a judicial tribunal the validity of the rate 
before liability for the penalties attaches. It failed, however, be-
cause the court was aware that it might have brought a bill in equity 
against the railroad commission and have secured a suspension of 
the penalty provision during the pendency of the proceedings. The 
remaining question in the case was whether the statutory penalty of 
from $so to $300 and a reasonable attorney's fee for each exaction 
in excess of the rate prescribed was so unreasonable as to offend 
against the requirements of due process. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, 
speaking for all the court except Mr. Justice McReynolds, observed 
that the penalty, though large when contrasted with the overcharge 
possible in any case, might still not unreasonably be justified in view 
of the numberless opportunities of violating the statute and the need 
for securing uniform adherence to it. The fact that the penalty 
·went to the aggrieved passenger and piight be disproportionate to 
his loss was held to be immaterial.1111 • 
•For notes on "fair value" see 20 CoLUM. L. Rev. 586, and 15 ILL. L. Riw. 
45. See also Gerard C. Henderson, "Railway Valuation and the Courts'', 33 
HARV. L. Riw. 902, 1031. In 18 M1c:e:. L. Rev. 774. is a note entitled "Public 
Utility Valuation-Cost-of-Production Theory and the World War." This 
discusses Lincoln Gas & Electric Co. v. Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256, 39 Sup. Ct. 
454 (19rg), and United States v. Interstate Commer~e Commission, 252 
U. S. 173, 40 Sup. Ct. 187 (1920), 19 M1c:e:. L. Rev. 26, note 46. Issues 
·between state and local authorities in respect to fixing rates are considered 
in 5 CoRN:ELY. L. Q. 354, and 15 It.r •. L. Rsv. 100. References to notes on prior 
contracts fixing rates with respect to their effect on the desires of public utili-
ties for an increase or the desires of local authorities to prevent central 
authorities from allowing an increase of rates will be given in the section 
dating with "Retroactive Civil Legislation." 
"251 U.S. 63, 40 Sup. Ct. 71 (1919). 
11 For other questions of procedure and of judicial interference, see 8 
CALI!?. L. Rm'. 18o, 33 HARV. L. Riw. 107, and 68 U. PA. L. Riw. 287. 
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The complainant in Ohio Valley Ht'ater Co. v. Ben AvonBorough~a 
was more fortunate. Under the procedure offered by the state stat-
ute the company had appealed from the commission to the superior 
court of the state and had the order of the commission set aside and 
the appraisal of its property raised. The state supreme court re-
versed the court below, holding that there was competent evidence 
tending to support the commission's conclusion and that no abuse of 
discretion appeared. This action ·was thought by a majority of the 
United States Supreme Court to be based on an interpretation of the 
state statute which withheld from the court power to determine the 
quesion of confiscation according to its independent judgment when 
the action of the commission is considered on appeal. Such limita-
tion on the reviewing power of the court was held to make the pro-
cedure wanting in the requisites of due process. The court was un-
able to satisfy itself that there was any adequate alternative method 
of testing the validity of the rates by proceedings in equity ancl so 
sent the case 'back to the state court, declaring that the plaintiff "has 
not yet had proper opportunity for an adequate judicial hearing as 
to confiscation; and unless such an opportunity is now available, and 
can be definitely indicated by the court below in the exercise. of its 
power finally to construe the laws of the state htcluding of course 
section 31 [the section relating to proc"eedings in equity], the chal-
lenged order is invalid." · 
For the minority, consisting of himself and Justice Holmes and 
Clarke, Mr. Justice Brandeis urged that the proceedings in equity 
were adequate and that the order was not invalid for absence of op-
portunity for full judicial review. He insisted therefore that the 
order must be affirmed "unless, as contended, the claim of confisca-
tion compels this court to decide, upon the weight of the evidence," 
whether or not the company's "property has been undervalued, or 
unless some error of law is shown." On this question, Mr. Justice 
Brandeis applied the general rule that on writs of error from a state 
court the Supreme Court must take the facts· as found below. As 
the only disputed question was the value of the property, he insisted 
that the case did not come within the exception that the Supreme 
Court may "upon writ of error to a state court 'examine the entire 
record, including the evidence, to determine whether what purports 
.. 253 U. S. --, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (1920). 
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to be a finding' upon questions of fact is 'so involved with and de-
pendent upon questions of federal law as to be really a decision' of 
the latter." Even in such case, he added, the Supreme Court must 
be actuated by the purpose, not to pass upon the relative weight of 
conflicting evidence and to substitute its judgment thereon for that 
of the court below, but "to ascertain whether a finding was unsup-
ported by evidence, or whether evidence was properly admitted or 
-excluded, or whether in some other way a ruling was involved which 
is within the appellate jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court. From 
this it would appear that what the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
by way of procedure is an opportunity for a judicial hearing on 
questions of fact in some court and not necessarily in some federal 
court or in any appellate tribunal. Whether the majority would 
agree with this is not certain, since their disposition of the case did 
not require them to affirm or to contradict it. The problem is one 
on which the law is still soft because of uncertainty as to how far 
the recognized exceptions. cut in to the recognized general rule. 
Inadequate procedure was found also in Oklahoma Operating Co. 
v. Love51 and in Oklahoma Gin Co. v. Oklahoma58 in which injunc-
tions were issued against orders of the state railroad commission 
enforcing prescribed rates and penalizing disobedience. Under :the 
statute in force when the proceedings were instituted the complain-
ants had no opportunity to contest the reasonableness of the rates 
before a judicial body except on appeal from proceedings before 
the commission for contempt. The penalties if the appeal were un-
successful might be $500 for each overcharge and $500 additional 
for each day's continuance of refusal to charge not more than the 
rates fixed. In the words of Mr. Justice Brandeis, they "are such 
as might well deter even the boldest and most confident." Before 
these cases reached the Supreme Court, Oklaho~a had seen the error 
of its ways and had provided for direct appeal to the Supreme Court 
from the order of the commission. But as the plaintiff was rightly 
in the federal courts, the suit was ordered to proceed for a determi-= 
nation of the question whether the rates were confiscatory. If such 
is the conclusion of the district court, it is to enjoin their enforce-
ment in any way. If it finds them not confiscatory, it is still to en-
111 252 U. S. 331, 40 Sup. Ct. 338 ( 1920). See r8 MICH. L. IU:v. 8c>4. 
11 252 U. S. 339, 40 Sup. Ct. 341 (1920). 
144 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
join the enforcement of the penalties accrued pendente lite, provided 
it finds that the plaintiff had reasona:ble grounds to contest the rates 
as confiscatory. · 
The statute involved in these two cases was one defining as a pub-
lic business subject to price fixing any business which by reason of 
-its nature, extent, or the exercise of a virtual monopoly therein, is 
1tuch that the public must use the same or its services. One com-
plainant ran a laundry and the other was ginning cotton, having 
combined with competitors to raise prices. The laundry concern 
had urged before the commission that it was not a monopoly within 
the section of the statute in question and that the section was void. 
This seems to be an assertion of an immunity from price fixing; 
but on the most interesting question whether a laundry can be sub-
jected to rate regulation like an elevator or a railroad, the Supreme 
Court says not a word. It declared, however, that the commission 
might proceed to investigate the plaintiff's rates and practices, "so 
long as its findings and conclusions are subjected to the review of the 
District Court herein." It can hardly be credited that all the mem-
bers of the court would consent to the implication that the mere fact 
that the public must use a laundry makes its charges constitutionally 
subject to regulation by a commission. Yet the handling of th~ case 
in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis is such that it would not be 
surprising if some of the judges later adduce it as a precedent in favor 
of the subjection to price-fixing of any business so situated that for 
a time it is relieved from the competition that keeps its charges rea-
sonably close to what would be enough to attract competitors into 
the enterprise if the way were open to them. 59 
Direct or indirect regulations of -commercial intercourse were 
approved in four cases. In Mtmday v. Wisconsin Trust Co.60 the 
power to impose conditions on the doing of business by foreign cor-
porations not engaged in interstate commerce was affirmed and ap-
plied to a provision invalidating deeds of land within the state to 
foreign corporations not admitted -to do business. The fact that the 
deed was executed and delivered in another state was said to make 
no difference, since the court had long ago declared that "the title 
n For discussions of the extension of price fixing see references in note 
44, supra, and notes in 33 HARv. L. Rsv. 838, 861. 
• 252 U. S. 499, 40 Sup. Ct. 365 (1920). 
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to land can be acquired and lost only in the manner prescribed by the 
law of the place where such land is situate." Dunbar v. City of New 
York61 found no offence against due process in giving the city a lien 
on the premises to which water is furnished, even though the meter 
is installed at the request of the tenant rather than of the owner. A 
statute forbidding the personal solicitation of employment to "prose-
cute, defend, 'present or collect" claims was sustained in M cCloskey 
-v. Tobin.62 Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out that prohibition of 
solicitation did not prohibit the business but merely regulated it. He 
ad~ed that "the evil against which the regulation is directed is one 
from which the English law has long sought to protect the com-
munity through proceedings for barratry and champerty" and that 
"regulation which aims to bring the conduct of ·the business into 
harmony with ethical practice of the legal profession, to which it is 
necessarily related, is obviously reasonable."63 
The remaining <:ase belongs under the head of industrial rela-
tions. This is New York Central R. Co. v. Bianc6i which sustained 
the provision in the New York Workmen's Compensation Law al-
lowing the commission to award damages for permanent facial dis-
figurement. Mr. Justice Pitney thought it most likely that any seri-
ous disfigurement would impair earning power, irrespective of its 
effect on mere capacity to work. But the absence of any finding of 
such impairment it?- the case before him moved hiiµ to declare that 
impairment of earning capacity is not essential to the constitu-
tionality of an award. He added that the state was at entire liberty 
to choose whether the award for disfigurement should be paid in a 
single sum or in instalments and whether it should be made in com-
bination with the compensation for inability to work computed with 
reference to loss of earning power or independently thereof. Under 
11 251 U. S. 516, 40 Sup. Ct. 250 (1920). 
"'252 U. S. 107, 40 Sup. Ct. 3o6 (1920). See 6 VA. L. ~ n. s. 213,. 
and 29 YAI.l! L. J. 68o. 
a See James W. Simonton, "The Validity of Special Legislation Granting 
Admission to a Profession'', 26 W. VA. L. Q. 102. The attorney's lien law 
of Pennsylvania is considered in 68 U. PA. L. Riw. 277; a discriminatocy 
exemption law, in 19 Co:r.uM. L. Riw. 502; a law forbidding the refilling of 
marked bottles, in 18 MICH. L. R.£'V. 546. 
14 250 U. S. 5g6, 40 Sup. Ct. 45 (1919). See 33 HARV. L. Riw. 473, 18 
MrcH. L. Rtv. 235, and 29 YAI.i:: L. J. 581. 
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the statute the award might be such sum as the commission deems 
proper, up to $31500. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented but wrote 
no opinion. Hi.s dissent is doubtless dependent on the fact that the 
statute imposes liability on the employer irrespective of negligence, 
as there could be no question about damages for such injuries when 
the person mulcted is at fault. 65 
This is an unusually small grist of police power cases for the 
Supreme Court to grind out in a term. Normally it considers more 
police power questions on a wider variety of subjects. It may be 
useful to list those subjects, if only to have pegs on which to hang 
footnotes to discussions in law reviews on decisions in other courts. 
One is the regulation of "rights of action," but-this is more conveni-
ently dealt with in a later section on Jurisdiction and Procedure of 
Courts. Another is "occupations and professions" under which 
McCloske:y T. Tobinee might have been put. A third is "physical 
COnditions".61 which might embrace a number Of the cases put Under 
the head of public utilities. For the rest we have "food and drink,"68 
.. The Arizona Workmen's Comp_ensation Law, which was declared con-
stitutional in Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, (Arizona Employers' Liability 
Cases), 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553 (I9I9), is considered in 20 CoLUY. 
L. Rev. 89, 33 HARv. L. Rmr. 86, I8 MICH. L. R~v. 3I6, and 29 Y~ L. J. 225. 
See 68 U. PA. L. Rmr. 363 for a note on a Rhode Island case declari~g 
unconstitutional a statute requiring theatre proprietors to employ a fire guard 
approved by fire commissioners at a compensation provided in the statute. 
•Note 6z, supra. 
n See 0. L. Waller, "Right of State to Regulate the Distribution of Water 
Right5", 90 CFHT. L. J. 97. See 20 COLUM. L. Rev. 350 for discussion of a 
case holding invalid an ordinance confining care of cemetery lots to superin-
tendent. See 4 MINN. L. Rev. 540 for note on case declaring unconstitu-
tional an ordinance forbidding the erection of a public garage without the 
consent of adjoining landowners. A case holding a public garage to be a 
nuisance is discussed in I8 MICH. L. Rmr. 234, and a similar condemnation 
of a morgue is treated in 33 HARV. L. Rev. 6I3. 
"" See Minor Bronaugh, "Limiting or Prohibiting the Possession of In-
toxicating Liquors for Personal Use", 23 LAW Notts 67, and Lindsay Rogers, 
'"Life, Liberty, and Liquor': A Note on the Police Power", 6 VA. L. Rev. 
I56. Barbour T. Georgia, 249 U. S. 454. 39 Sup. Ct. 3I6 (I9I9), sustai~ing a 
statute prohibiting possession of liquor acquired after its enactment is com-
mented on in 6 VA. L. Rev. 6o. 
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"social and moral interests,"80 and "methods of enforcement."70 
Any classification of police power questions is necessarily somewhat 
arbitrary, but the law of the police power as a whole is so amorphous 
that even a poor way of classifying is better than none.71 
v. EMIN~N'l' DOMAIN 
In four of the cases already considered there was complaint that 
the unwelcome interferences were takings which required compen-
sation. In none of them did the government profess to be exercising 
the power of eminent domain. In Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries 
& Warehouse Co.72 which sustained the War Prohibition Act of 
November 21, 1918, Mr. Justice Brandeis said that "there was no 
appropriation of the liquor for public purposes." He pointed out 
that it had never been necessary to decide whether an absolut~ prohi-
bition of the sale of liquor acquired before the enactment of the pro-
hibitory law is proper and that the question did not arise in the 
case at bar since the law did not become effective until over seven 
months after it was passed. The fact that liquor couid not be ad-
vantageously sold till well ripened or aged was called a "resulting 
inconvenience to the owner attributable to the inherent qualities of 
the property itself," which "cannot be regarded as a taking of prop-
erty in the constitutional sense." The point came up again in Rtep-
pert v. Caffey13 which sustained the Volstead Act. The plaintiff 
contended that "even if immediate prohibition of the sale of its non-
•See 33 HARV. T,. R£V. 1o8 for discussion of a state anti-loafing law; 4 
MINN. L. Rev. 449 on prohibiting foreign languages in public schools; 33 
HARV. L. REv. lo8 on denying to aliens privilege of running pool rooms; 33 
HARV. L. Rev. no on state law against inciting hostility to the United States; 
18 MICH. L. Rtv. 7g6 on prohibiting display of flag of organization hostile 
to our form of government; and 29 YALE L. J. 936 on protection of the 
United States flag from desecration. 
••See Slow AL. "BurL. 63 for note on power of health hoard to detain per-
sons afflicted with venereal disease, and 6 VA. L. REv. 583 for discussion of 
forfeiture of property of innocent persons used in violation of law. 
"For a general article on police power sl!e Thomas Reed Powell, "The 
Police Power in American Constitutional Law", l JoURN. CoMP. LEG. AND 
INT. LAW. (p:irt 3) 100. 
"251 U.S. 146, 40 Sup. Ct. Io6 (19I9), 19 MICH. L. REv. 8. note n. 
'"251 U.S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct 141 (1920), 19 M1cH. L. Rev. 9, note 12. 
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intoxicating beer is within the war power, this can be legally ef-
fected, only provided compensation is made." Mr. Justice Brandeis 
called attention to the fact that in one of the earliest cases one of the 
judgments affirmed was "for violation of the act by selling beer ac-
quired before its enactment .... and that it was assumed without dis4 
cussion that the same rule applied to the brewery and its product." 
He then continued: · 
"But we are not required to determine here the limits in 
this respect of the police power of the states; nor whether the 
principle is applicable here under which the federal govern-
ment has been declared to be free from liability to an owner, 
'for private property injured or destroyed during war, by the 
operations of the armies. in the field, or by measures neces-
sary for their safety and efficiency' ... ; in analogy to that by 
which states are exempt from liability for the demolition of a 
house in the path of a conflagration ... ; or for garbage of 
value taken ... ; or ·for unwholesome food of value destroyed 
... for the preservation of the public health. Here as in 
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., supra) 
there was no appropriation of private property, ·but merely a 
lessening of value due to a permissible restriction imposed 
upon its use." 
This is plainly a stretch of the Kentucky Distillerie~ case, since 
the Volstead Act became effective on its passage. There is nothing' 
in the dissenting opinion in the Ruppert case indicating specifically 
that the objectors would have been mollified if the Volstead Act had 
provided compensation, though Mr. Justice McReynolds refers to 
the Fifth Amendment and the "well settled rights of individuals in 
harmless property." . 
In Board of P1eblic Utility Conimissioners v. Ynchausti & Co.1-1. 
which sustained a requirement of free carriage of the mails from 
vessels engaged in the Philippine coasting trade, the Chief Justice 
said that "it is impossible to conceive how either the guaranty by the 
Bill of Rights of due process or ifs prohibition against the taking of 
private property for public use without compensation can have the 
slightest application to the case if the Philippine government possess-
"2s1 U. S. 401, 40 Sup. Ct. 2'77 (1920), 19 MICH. L. Rlw. 20, note 32. 
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ed the plenary power, under the sanction of Congress, to limit the 
right to engage in the coastwise trade to those who agree to carry 
the mails free." This, no logi~ian would deny. This plenary power 
having been found, the claim to :compensation was denied. But the 
Chief Justice lays down that if the power had not been plenary as 
stated, the requirement could not have been sustained "because by 
accepting a license the shipowners voluntarily assumed the obligation 
0f free carriage.'' But in L(ls Angeles v. I~os Angeles Gas & Electric 
Corporation75 in which the police power was held not to justify an 
order to remove poles and wires to make room for those of a com-
peting municipal system, there was held to be a taking which was 
unjustified in the absence of compensation. This is to say that what 
the city tried to do under the police power, it might do only by an 
exercise of eminent domain.78 
In Hays v. Port of Seattle,71 too, a point of eminent domain was 
indirectly involved. What was alleged to be an impairment of the 
obligation of a contract was held to be a breach or repudiation of the 
contract, leaving such obligation as it bad still outstanding. This ob-
ligation still formed the measure of the right to recover damages. 
No denial of due process was involved because whatever property 
rights were taken were taken for a public purpose, and the provision 
fo the sta'te statutes for suing the state and having the judgment paid 
out of the state treasury "satisfies the requirement of due process of 
law as clearly as if the ascertainment of compensation had preceded 
the taking." 
For this, Mr. Justice Pitney cited Bragg v. Weaver,78 decided a 
n Note SI, supra. 
11 For other notes on whether there has been such a "taking" as to require 
compensation see 33 HARV. L. Riw. 451, 476, and 29 YAU~ L. J. 43I. 
The determination of what is "just compensation" is considered in 19 
CoI.U.M. L. R£v. 492, 33 HA!tv. L. R£v. <ft!., 18 MICH. L. R£v. 6I, 799, and 
68 U. PA. i.. REv. I86. 
Cases holding it a "public use" to condemn land against use for apart-
ment houses are discussed in 20 CoLUM. L. R£v. 219, s91, 5 CoRNn.L L. Q. 330, 
I8 M1cH. L. Rsv. 523, 4 MINN. L. R!W. so, 236, and 29 YALr: L. J. 936. 
See also William E. Britton, "Constitutional Changes in Eminent Domain 
in Illinois", 2 Ju.. L. BuI.L. 497. 
TT 251 u. s. 233; 40 Sup. Ct. 125 (1920). 
"251 U.S. 57, 40 Sup. Ct. 63 (I9I9). See 5 VA. L. Rr:G. n. s. 793, and 29 
YALE L. J. 577. 
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month earlier. Here a landowner who sought an injunction against 
taking earth from his land to repair the highway objected that the 
statute under which it was done "makes no provision for affording 
the owner an oppo_rtunity to be heard respecting the necessity or ex-
pediency of the taking or the compensation to be paid." After re-
marking that it was conceded that the taking was for a public use 
and that adequate provision was made for the p~yment of such com-
pensation as may be awarded, Mr. Justice Van Devanter declares: 
"Where the intended use is public, the necessity and expedi-
ency of the taking may be c;Ietermined by such agency and in 
such mode as the state may designate. They are legislative 
questions, no matter who may be charged with their decision, 
and a hearing thereon is not essential to due process in. the 
sense of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
With respect to compensation he continues: 
"But it is essential to due process that the mode of deter-
mining the compensation be such as to afford the owner an 
opportunity to be heard. Among several admissible modes is 
that of causing the amount to be assessed ·by viewers, subject 
to an appeal to a court carrying with it a rightJ:o have the mat-
ter determined upon a full trial. . . . And where this mode is 
adopted due process does not require that a hearing before 
the viewers be afforded, but is satisfied by the full hearing 
that may be obtained by exercising the right to appeal." 
These requirements were found to be satisfied by the procedure 
offered by the Virginia statutes. These had not been construed by 
the state court, but the only question was whether the landowner was 
sufficiently protected in his chance to get his appeal to the court from 
the decision of the supervisors on the award of the viewers. Mr. 
Bragg seemed to fear that his rights might be foreclosed without 
his knowledge if he were not present when the supervisors decided 
how much to pay him. But the court found that under such cir-
cumstances he was to be notified and was entitled to thirty days in 
which to appeal. It was assumed that if he were actually present at 
the supervisors' meeting,.he had sufficient notice and that thirty days 
from then was long enough in which to appeal. The claim that the 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
determination of compensation must precede the actual talcing was 
dismissed by saying: 
"But it is settled by the decisions of this court that where 
adequate provision is made for the certain payment of the 
compensation without unreasonable delay the taking does not 
contravene due process of law because it precedes the ascer-
tainment of what compensation is just." 
It is to be remembered that Mr. Justice Van Devanter's general 
shj.tements throughout the opinion are made with reference to an 
exercise of eminent domain by public, and not by private, authori-
ties. 
THOMAS Rsm> Povno:r.r,. 
Columbia University. 
{To be concluded) 
